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The present study examined differences in stressors, coping strategies, and military 
performance in two groups deployed in the same war scenario, but with operative and 
psychologically different challenges.  
A total of 173 military personnel participated in the study. Questionnaires measuring stress, 
coping strategies and military performance were administered before and after deployment in 
Afghanistan. Hierarchical Regression Analyses measured the extent to which stressors or 
coping strategies explained variance in military performance.   
Operational personnel judged their military performance better than Staff personnel. Social 
Support was the most important predictor variables of military performance. The results are 
discussed with regard to differences in the operative and psychological challenges during 
service and the general effect of stressors and social support on military performance. 




For many years studies of stressors and their impact on stress reactions and impaired performance 
have been a major focus in military psychological research. Less has been done to find out what 
makes soldiers withstand challenges and even increase their performance as a result of experienced 
stressors (Britt, Castro and Adler 2006, Driskell, Salas and Johnston 2006). A limited number of 
studies have explored the connection between stressors, coping strategies and military 
performance. (Hall, 2009; Overdale and Gardner 2012; Limber 2012). However, Milgram, 
Orenstein and Zafrirs’ (1989) study of Israeli soldiers in the Lebanon war was a significant 
exploration of stressors and coping strategies’ impact on military performance. Common to these 
studies was the finding that social support, as a coping strategy, had a positive impact on military 
performance.  The current Study continues the search for an understanding of the relationship 
between these important factors in a military psychological environment (Campell and Novel, 





What is the stressor burden in a modern war context and how do military personnel cope 
with it? What is the impact of stressors and coping strategies on military performance? 
Similar measurements have been carried out in previous studies on Norwegian military 
personnel in both Bosnia and Kosovo (Laberg et al. 2002; Moldjord et al. 2001, 2003; 
Solberg, 1997, 2007). 
 
Stressors in modern war scenarios 
”Modern war” operations alternate flexibly between high-intensity combat, peacekeeping and 
stability operations, and humanitarian or nation-building projects. The boundaries between these 
activities are often invisible with no clearly “front line” and soldiers need to cope flexibly with the 
shifting challenges of war and peace building (Mastroianni, Mabry, Benedek, & Ursano, 2008). For 
soldiers trained to oppose more traditional enemies this context could be uniquely stressful (Hoge 
et. al 2004). In modern war theatres combat-related risk and exposure to extreme stress are 
experienced as potential threats to all personnel involved in missions, regardless of their 
occupational training or operational duties (Mastroianni et.al 2008). Any service member in the 
wars of Iraq and Afghanistan has been vulnerable to insurgent attacks, such as riots among 
civilians, grenade attacks and unexpected shelling in camp, and roadside bombs and kidnapping 
when moving outside camp (Campell and Nobel, 2009; Giustozzi, 2007; Johansen 2011; 
Mastroianni et.al 2008). Has the burden of deployment to service “in camp” become as stressful as 
being exposed to combat? 
 
Campell and Novel (2009) make a distinction between four different subsets of stressors in the 
modern military psychological environment and delineate deployment from garrison and civil 
occupation: (1) Life-threatening combat stressors like active fighting and coming under fire. (2) 
Stressors associated with risk of injury or to life through unexpected acts of violation and lack of 
countermeasures. (3) Observing others as targets, like seriously injured comrades or witnessing 
suffering or someone dying. (4) Restraint and strict rules of engagement. In this study these subsets 
of stressors are used as a basis for comparison in the discussion. 
 
Military performance 
Military training focuses on building confidence and high standards of military performance 
intended to cope with combat contexts (Driskell et al. 2006; Krueger, 2008) and completing their 
missions (Hancock and Szalma, 2006). In preparations directed towards specific deployments, 
military personnel are trained in skills needed to cope with that particular mission (Delahaij, 
Gaillard, & Soeters, 2006), but are not as drilled over time as in traditional military training. Prior to 
each contingent rotation of the military unit investigated in the current study, a one-week pre-
deployment preparatory phase for all servicemen was conducted, as a specific joint training for 
completing the mission in Afghanistan. Such an event often creates high expectations of one’s own 
military performance, because it (1) increases knowledge of what to expect, (2) takes future risk and 
uncertainty into consideration and (3) creates confidence about completing the upcoming mission 
(Campell and Novel, 2009, Driskell et al. 2006).  A person's expectations of his/her ability to 
perform adequate actions in specific situations are believed to be essential for performance 
(Bandura 1997). Driskell et al. (2006) noted that to make performance on military skills, personnel 
need a balanced stress intensity experience. Experiences which incorporate either no stress or too 
3 
 
high intensity are both likely to be counterproductive (Friedland and Keinan, 1992). However, 
stressful experiences can be an opportunity for positive individual growth. Personnel who have been 
exposed to extreme stress will often cope better emotionally if they believe their experience serves a 
higher purpose (Lukey & Tepe 2008). This is supported by Mandel, et al. (2010) who found that 
military officers, who intervened in a human-rights violation, assessed their performance weaker if 
they contributed at lower intensity level than those who contributed at higher intensity level. Those 
who tried to intervene but failed assessed their performance even worse. In this study we measure 
expectations of military performance before and after deployment and investigate what can 
influence changes in self-assessed military performance. 
  
Coping strategies in the military context 
 
Lazarus & Folkman’s (1984) defined coping as the strategies and processes that individuals use to 
modify adverse aspects of their environment. In a study of a UN helicopter unit in Bosnia, five 
strategies used to cope with the military psychological environment were found: (1) Seeking safety, 
(2) Diversion through stimuli, (3) Seeking changes of scene, (4) Seeking diversion by thinking 
about other things, and (5) Seeking social support (Moldjord, Fossum, & Holen, 2001; 2003). Other 
studies have identified coping strategies in a military context as behavioural activities that can 
distract the mind from the war like physical exercise, reading and doing other activities that occupy 
thoughts (Laberg, Johnsen, Eid, & Brun, 2002; Solberg, 1997). Lazarus & Folkman’s (1984) 
cognitive model does not, however, consider the importance of cohesion and how social support 
effect performance.   Previous research has shown that social support in the form of, support from 
leaders, cohesiveness and close friendship may help individuals cope a stressful situation 
adequately and thus create growth conditions and not stress reactions in the aftermath of service 
(Bliese & Britt, 2001; Britt, 2004; Cohen 2004; Delahaij, Gaillard, & Soeters, 2006; Cobb, 1976; 
Grossman, 2004; Hall, 2009; Limbert, 2004; Milgram, et al. 1989; Overdale and Gardner 2012; 
Reevy, 2007). In the current study Social Support refers to cohesiveness in unit, mutual trust and 
close friendship among unit personnel (Cobb, 1976; Milgram, et al. 1989).  
 
High levels of social support and unit cohesion tend to make groups function well during demands 
of high performance (Cohen 2004). Milgram et al. (1989) found group cohesiveness to have the 
highest correlation with military performance during time of combat and after combat in “holding 
position”. Overdale and Gardner (2012) found perceived social support from leaders to have a 
positive impact on performance among trainees. Limbert (2004) found that perceptions of social 
support were associated with job satisfaction.  
 
The subjects for this study, all officers, were a selection of military servicemen deployed in the 
same geographical and cultural environments of Afghanistan, with shared purpose and common 
situational awareness, but in two separate groups: one operational and one in a more withdrawn 
setting in camp, but still prone to war threats similar to Campel and Novel’s (2009) subsets two, 
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Purpose of study 
The aim of this study was to examine the amount of different stressors, the use of coping strategies 
and the assessment of military performance in a modern war scenario. We compared the scores of 
military aircrew members and military “in-camp” personnel on these measurements. Given the prior 
research to these issues we wanted to explore the following hypotheses: (1) Operational personnel 
experience higher stressor exposure than “in camp” personnel, (2) Seeking Social Support extract as 
a separate coping strategy component on Coping Strategies Scale, (3) Operational personnel have 
higher increase in self-assessment military performance than “in camp” personnel after deployment 
(4) War stressor experience has positive impact on self-assessed military performance (5) Social 
Support has positive impact on self-assessed military performance. 
 
Method 
Participants and context of study 
Participants in this study consisted of personnel in The Norwegian Aeromedical Detachment (NAD) 
in Afghanistan. For NAD, the main task was to operate a medical evacuation helicopter unit, and 
rescue wounded soldiers for the international coalition in the area of Faryab in Afghanistan. 
Although the unit did not have an explicit combat role, an escort helicopter with door-gunners 
always accompanied the ambulance helicopter on missions.  Because of Rules of Engagement 
(ROEs), the Staff personnel were bound to their functions in the camp and initially excluded from 
moving outside the camp area. 
  
The NAD helicopter unit consisted of 43 personnel in continual service. The Operational Unit 
consisted of 13 persons (aircrew personnel) operating two Bell 412 helicopters. The ambulance 
helicopter crew consisted of pilot, system operator and two medics. The escort helicopter included 
pilot, system operator and two door-gunners. The ambulance and the escort helicopters always 
operated together as one helicopter unit here defined as Aircrew. Among the 30 servicemen “in-
camp” we found the detachment commander and his staff, intelligence personnel, mission support 
personnel, maintenance personnel, fire department and air medic (AME). These are defined as Staff.  
 
The NAD was established in Afghanistan in April 2008 and organized in contingents each serving 
for 6 months (Contingent I served 12 months). Until October 2010, four contingents were deployed.  
Staff personnel included contingents while operational categories (pilots, system operators, medics) 
rotated across contingents’ periods and could have more than one deployment. The survey was 





Table 1: Demographic Variables Aircrew vs Staff Compared. 
               Age          Sex      Marital Status           Mil Education¹         Int Deployments² 
     <29     29-39     >39  Male   Female        Single   Partner         Grad     Non-Gr         1          2          3 
Aircrew     30%      45%     24%           92%      8%               38%      62%              48%      51%             39%    26%    36%  
Staff     30%      28%     40%           87%    13%               38%      62%              51%      48%             49%    18%    29% 
Note. N = 69 Aircrew, 94 Staff. ¹Military Education: Graduate (Grad) = Officers Academy Level I & II, Non-Graduate 
(Non Gr) = Sergeant school/training. ²International Deployments: 1=NAD is first deployment, 2= NAD is 
second deployment, 3=Third deployment or more. 
 
Between October 2008 and October 2010, 175 NAD personnel, responded to Questionnaire 1 (Q1), 
and 109 responded to Questionnaire 2 (Q2). Table 1 shows demographic variables of Aircrew and 
Staff. The number of respondents will vary in the different analyzes and results because unequal 
numbers of respondents answered fully the different questionnaires. The different N’s are shown in 
the Results section. Because different categories of personnel rotated at different times, it was not 
possible to get an exact overview of whom and how many individuals had multiple deployments. 
For that reason the exact response rate was difficult to calculate. Despite that, none has more than 
one assignment recorded in the data.  
 
Procedure   
 
Participation was voluntary and based on signed consent. Participants were given a letter of 
information about the general purpose of the study. A unique identification number written on each 
questionnaire connected Q1 to Q2 for each respondent. The id numbers were linked to a list of 
respondents’ names and home addresses. The list was kept safe by the survey administrators. Q1 
was collected, in Norway, right before or during the departure to Afghanistan. Q2 was collected in 
Afghanistan just before returning home to Norway or was sent to the home address, containing a 
stamped return envelope, right after homecoming. The survey was approved by the Regional Ethics 
Committee and the Head of the Norwegian Air Force. 
 
Measuring instruments  
 
Different deployed settings are not functionally identical. It is therefore a challenge to measure 
general stressors that apply to all deployment types (Campbell and Nobel, 2009). This study uses a 
survey that was created on the basis of interviews with UN military personnel serving in the wars of 
Bosnia (Moldjord et al., 2001, 2003; Solberg, 1997) and further developed in the Kosovo study 
(Kobbeltvedt et al 2004; Laberg et al. 2002; Solberg, Laberg, Johnsen, & Eid, 2005; Solberg, 2007).  
Changes were made in the current scales adapted to the context in Afghanistan and based on five 
interviews of personnel serving in NAD Contingent I, in 2008, in Afghanistan. From a larger survey 
of a post and pre deployment questionnaires, results from the following measuring instruments were 
reported in the current study. From Q1 we used demographic variables and Military Skills 
Expectancies Scale. From Q2 we used the Stressor Scale ( Laberg et al. 2002; Moldjord et al., 2001, 
2003; Solberg, et al., 2005; Solberg, 2007), Coping Strategies Scale (Moldjord et al., 2001, 2003) 
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The Stressor Scale aimed at measuring the frequency of stressful and critical situations during the 
mission. Previous studies, using the Stressor Scale, have revealed high values of internal 
consistency, with alpha values >.70 (Fossum, & Moldjord, 1999; Kobbeltvedt, et al., 2004; Solberg 
et al., 2005; Solberg, 1997). The scale originally consisted of 28 items rated on an evaluation scale 
of Likert type ranging from 0 (never) to 7 (continuously) and consisted of items such as “how often 
did you see seriously wounded or killed persons, how often were you being shot at”. In the current 
study the questionnaire were adjusted and adapted to the challenges in Afghanistan and reduced to 
27 items. In the current study the reliability was found to be satisfactory, Cronbach alpha = .89. 
  
The Coping Strategies Scale aimed at measuring the importance of various cognitive, behavioural 
and social strategies which were used to cope with stressful challenges. Coping Strategies Scale 
originally consisted of 24 items using an evaluation scale of Likert type ranging from unimportant 
(1) to very important (7). Items were like the following: “For me, talking to colleagues in the unit 
about the incident was...” and “For me, to know that the camp area was guarded was...”. Former 
studies, using this scale, revealed satisfactory internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha values 
between .64 and .88 on five components extracted from the questionnaire (Fossum, & Moldjord, 
1999; Laberg et al. 2002; Moldjord et al., 2001, 2003). In the current study the scale consisted of 22 
items based on the scales used in former studies. Six of the original 24 items were taken out of the 
scale (e.g: “to have access to alcohol”, which was not allowed in NAD) and four items were added 
based on different conditions in Afghanistan compared to Bosnia and Kosovo. Examples of the new 
items are “to do something useful for the civilian population was” and “to think that it was 
statistically unlikely to get injured”.  
  
The Military Skills Scale aimed to measure military performance through how the respondents 
evaluated their handling of military challenges such as, “keeping a cool head in stressful 
situations”, “willingness to act on command in emergency situations”, “cope with periods of low 
activity”. The 19-item Military Skills Scale was measured as expectancies before deployment and 
self-assessment after deployment and rated on an evaluation scale of Likert type ranging from 1 
(very good) to 5 (very weak) and 6 (don’t know). Former studies have revealed satisfactory internal 
consistency, with Cronbach alpha above .7 (Fossum, & Moldjord, 1999; Laberg et al., 2002; 
Solberg, 1997, 2007). Through the interpretation of responses we found that parts of the respondent 
group of Staff personnel had answered ‘don’t know’ on items which they had limited chance to gain 
experience with (e.g.: “my ability to act even if I am threatened was”). The rating alternative 6 
(don’t know), was therefore interpreted to represent ‘not experienced’. The response scale was 
reversed in the analyses, giving “not experienced” the value of 0. The Cronbach alpha coefficient 
was .88 (scale measured pre deployment, N=135) and .92 (scale measured post deployment, 
N=107).  
 
Statistical Analyses                                                                                                           
Principal Component analyses were used to examine the component structure of the Stressors and 
Coping Strategies Scales. Reliability Analyses (Chronbach Alpha) were used to measure internal 
consistency of the indices. In addition item-total correlation analyses were performed to examine 
the ability of the indices.  Frequency distribution was used to determine the percentage ranking and 
the most common stressors and coping strategies.  A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
was conducted to compare the, Stressors, Coping Strategies and Military Skills scores for different 
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groups of NAD personnel. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses were used to predict Military 




Stressor     
                                                                                                                               
Measuring the mean score on each stressor item on the Stressors Scale and the frequency of the 
number of respondents who experienced each stressor at least once, we found; ”to be called out at 
night without warning” to be the stressor that most of  the NAD personnel experienced (M=2.10, 
75.2%)”. The second most frequent stressor in NAD was ”to experience the service as boring” 
(M=2.49, 73,4%) followed by “to be outside the camp area” (M=2.82, 69.6%),“to see seriously 
wounded or killed persons” (M=2.40, 68,8%), “to have technical problems during operations” 
(M=1.49, 60.6%). The two least frequented stressors items were “to be seriously threatened with 
weapons” (M=0.07, 4,6%) and “ to be threatened by the civilian population” (M=0.02, 0,9%) 
A Principal Component Analysis, with oblique rotation, was conducted on 23 items of the Stressors 
Scale. 4 items failed to load (e.g: ”to experience the service as boring”). Prior to performing PCA, 
the assumption of data was assessed. An inspection of the scree plot showed inflexions that would 
justify retaining 4 components (Costello and Osborne 2005) and with eigenvalues exceeding 
Kaiser’s criterion of 1, explaining 61.8% of the total variance and 36.6%, 10.7%, 8.2% and 6.3% of 
the variance, respectively. The reliability and internal consistency of the four factor component 
structure was satisfactory with α > .79 on each component and average corrected item total 
correlation above .72 (Costello and Osborne, 2005).  Table 2 shows the items clustered in four 
different components. The first component was entitled Risk of Equipment Failure which indicated 
that the military equipment was not always to be trusted. This component measured the extent of 
technical problems, the breaking of normal rules and equipment such as radio or GPS etc. that did 
not work at all times. The second component measured was War-related Threat, i.e. the extent of 
threat that was challenging but not necessarily life threatening. Stressors were impressions like 
missions at night, shelling and flying into combat zones. It was expected that this stressor 
constituted a heavy load for Aircrew personnel. The third component was entitled Harmful 
Exposure. This component measured the extent of close contact with the wounded and dead people 
who were brought in by the ambulance helicopter and surprisingly call-outs at night. The fourth 
stressor component was Direct Threat to Life which indicated more heavily threatening stressors, 
such as being shot at, seeking shelter because of grenade attacks and threat of the use of weapons.  
Table 2:  Component loadings of ”Stressors Scale”.  
Item        Pattern coefficients 
How often did you….      C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4  
Component 1: Risk of Equipment Failure      
See people starving or in need      .54 -.04  .25  .32 
Have to break ROEs, normally used at home, to fulfill your tasks .66 -.03  .13  .21 
Experience that your equipment did not meet operational demands .64  .10  .16  .17 
Stumble close to combat      .42  .34  .31 -.03 
Have technical problems during operations    .69 -.01 -.23  .19 
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Find yourself in situation unable to contact your family   .47  .02  .39 -.06 
Were you worried       .51  .37  .20 -.10 
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The Stressor Scale aimed at measuring the frequency of stressful and critical situations during the 
mission. Previous studies, using the Stressor Scale, have revealed high values of internal 
consistency, with alpha values >.70 (Fossum, & Moldjord, 1999; Kobbeltvedt, et al., 2004; Solberg 
et al., 2005; Solberg, 1997). The scale originally consisted of 28 items rated on an evaluation scale 
of Likert type ranging from 0 (never) to 7 (continuously) and consisted of items such as “how often 
did you see seriously wounded or killed persons, how often were you being shot at”. In the current 
study the questionnaire were adjusted and adapted to the challenges in Afghanistan and reduced to 
27 items. In the current study the reliability was found to be satisfactory, Cronbach alpha = .89. 
  
The Coping Strategies Scale aimed at measuring the importance of various cognitive, behavioural 
and social strategies which were used to cope with stressful challenges. Coping Strategies Scale 
originally consisted of 24 items using an evaluation scale of Likert type ranging from unimportant 
(1) to very important (7). Items were like the following: “For me, talking to colleagues in the unit 
about the incident was...” and “For me, to know that the camp area was guarded was...”. Former 
studies, using this scale, revealed satisfactory internal consistency with Cronbach’s alpha values 
between .64 and .88 on five components extracted from the questionnaire (Fossum, & Moldjord, 
1999; Laberg et al. 2002; Moldjord et al., 2001, 2003). In the current study the scale consisted of 22 
items based on the scales used in former studies. Six of the original 24 items were taken out of the 
scale (e.g: “to have access to alcohol”, which was not allowed in NAD) and four items were added 
based on different conditions in Afghanistan compared to Bosnia and Kosovo. Examples of the new 
items are “to do something useful for the civilian population was” and “to think that it was 
statistically unlikely to get injured”.  
  
The Military Skills Scale aimed to measure military performance through how the respondents 
evaluated their handling of military challenges such as, “keeping a cool head in stressful 
situations”, “willingness to act on command in emergency situations”, “cope with periods of low 
activity”. The 19-item Military Skills Scale was measured as expectancies before deployment and 
self-assessment after deployment and rated on an evaluation scale of Likert type ranging from 1 
(very good) to 5 (very weak) and 6 (don’t know). Former studies have revealed satisfactory internal 
consistency, with Cronbach alpha above .7 (Fossum, & Moldjord, 1999; Laberg et al., 2002; 
Solberg, 1997, 2007). Through the interpretation of responses we found that parts of the respondent 
group of Staff personnel had answered ‘don’t know’ on items which they had limited chance to gain 
experience with (e.g.: “my ability to act even if I am threatened was”). The rating alternative 6 
(don’t know), was therefore interpreted to represent ‘not experienced’. The response scale was 
reversed in the analyses, giving “not experienced” the value of 0. The Cronbach alpha coefficient 
was .88 (scale measured pre deployment, N=135) and .92 (scale measured post deployment, 
N=107).  
 
Statistical Analyses                                                                                                           
Principal Component analyses were used to examine the component structure of the Stressors and 
Coping Strategies Scales. Reliability Analyses (Chronbach Alpha) were used to measure internal 
consistency of the indices. In addition item-total correlation analyses were performed to examine 
the ability of the indices.  Frequency distribution was used to determine the percentage ranking and 
the most common stressors and coping strategies.  A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) 
was conducted to compare the, Stressors, Coping Strategies and Military Skills scores for different 
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groups of NAD personnel. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses were used to predict Military 




Stressor     
                                                                                                                               
Measuring the mean score on each stressor item on the Stressors Scale and the frequency of the 
number of respondents who experienced each stressor at least once, we found; ”to be called out at 
night without warning” to be the stressor that most of  the NAD personnel experienced (M=2.10, 
75.2%)”. The second most frequent stressor in NAD was ”to experience the service as boring” 
(M=2.49, 73,4%) followed by “to be outside the camp area” (M=2.82, 69.6%),“to see seriously 
wounded or killed persons” (M=2.40, 68,8%), “to have technical problems during operations” 
(M=1.49, 60.6%). The two least frequented stressors items were “to be seriously threatened with 
weapons” (M=0.07, 4,6%) and “ to be threatened by the civilian population” (M=0.02, 0,9%) 
A Principal Component Analysis, with oblique rotation, was conducted on 23 items of the Stressors 
Scale. 4 items failed to load (e.g: ”to experience the service as boring”). Prior to performing PCA, 
the assumption of data was assessed. An inspection of the scree plot showed inflexions that would 
justify retaining 4 components (Costello and Osborne 2005) and with eigenvalues exceeding 
Kaiser’s criterion of 1, explaining 61.8% of the total variance and 36.6%, 10.7%, 8.2% and 6.3% of 
the variance, respectively. The reliability and internal consistency of the four factor component 
structure was satisfactory with α > .79 on each component and average corrected item total 
correlation above .72 (Costello and Osborne, 2005).  Table 2 shows the items clustered in four 
different components. The first component was entitled Risk of Equipment Failure which indicated 
that the military equipment was not always to be trusted. This component measured the extent of 
technical problems, the breaking of normal rules and equipment such as radio or GPS etc. that did 
not work at all times. The second component measured was War-related Threat, i.e. the extent of 
threat that was challenging but not necessarily life threatening. Stressors were impressions like 
missions at night, shelling and flying into combat zones. It was expected that this stressor 
constituted a heavy load for Aircrew personnel. The third component was entitled Harmful 
Exposure. This component measured the extent of close contact with the wounded and dead people 
who were brought in by the ambulance helicopter and surprisingly call-outs at night. The fourth 
stressor component was Direct Threat to Life which indicated more heavily threatening stressors, 
such as being shot at, seeking shelter because of grenade attacks and threat of the use of weapons.  
Table 2:  Component loadings of ”Stressors Scale”.  
Item        Pattern coefficients 
How often did you….      C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4  
Component 1: Risk of Equipment Failure      
See people starving or in need      .54 -.04  .25  .32 
Have to break ROEs, normally used at home, to fulfill your tasks .66 -.03  .13  .21 
Experience that your equipment did not meet operational demands .64  .10  .16  .17 
Stumble close to combat      .42  .34  .31 -.03 
Have technical problems during operations    .69 -.01 -.23  .19 
Experience being without radio contact during operations  .50  .46  .17  .03 
Find yourself in situation unable to contact your family   .47  .02  .39 -.06 
Were you worried       .51  .37  .20 -.10 
Component 2: War-related Threat      
Patrolling during night or in bad weather conditions   .02  .90 -.13 -.14 
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Enter or fly into conflict areas with ongoing actions of war   .15  .75  .13  .12 
Experience your vehicle/fly being exposed to fire or shrapnel                -.43  .73  .12  .23 
Experience your vehicle/fly having to maneuver away from threats   .20  .50  .34 .-11 
See damaged buildings and infrastructure      .35  .46  .17  .03 
Were you outside the camp area       .06  .80 -.17  .10 
Component 3: Harmful Exposure     
Were you called out at night without warning     .04 -.23  .81 -.09 
See dead bodies                      -.02  .07  .76  .21 
See seriously wounded or killed persons                   -.02  .11  .73  .10 
Component 4: Direct Threat to Life     
Were you forced to take cover because of war actions    .13 -.09  .11  .78 
Were you being shot at        -.29  .47  .16  .63 
Were you seriously threatened with weapons      -.04  .01  .17  .78 
Were you threatened by mines         .23 -.03 -.14  .47 
Were you in life threatening danger       .05  .02  .07  .70 
See colleagues being shot at                                                                   .31  .19  .32  .38 
Eigenvalues                                                                                                  8.43        2.46        1.88        1.44 
% of variance*                                                                                                      36.63      10.70       8.18       6.27  
Alpha                                                                                                                 .85    .81       .81       .74 
Note. *Total variance explained = 62%. C= Stressor Component in the Pattern coefficients matrix. 
 
Table 3 shows Aircrew personnel had higher mean value rating on all stressor dimensions compared 
to Staff personnel, which means that Aircrew personnel were subjected to more stressors than Staff 
personnel. As seen in Table 3, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) showed there was a 
statistically significant overall higher score among Aircrew personnel than Staff personnel in 
Stressors, Wilks’ Lambda =.37, F (4, 100) = 42.78, p< .001, Eta² = .63. 
 
Table 3:  Differences in Stressor Experience Aircrew and Staff personnel compared 
 
 Air crew personnel Ser  Staff personnel 
Stressors  4 Dimensions     N M  SD  N M  SD              F value  
S1. Risk of Equipment 
Failure 
48 1.45 1.17  57 0.67 0.81             16.46*** 
S2. War-related Threat 48 2.53 1.01  57 0.52 0.69           146.70*** 
S3. Harmful Exposure 48 1.94 1.64  57 1.76 1.35                  .62 
S4. Direct Threat to Life 48 0.30 0.51  57 0.08 0.39               6.07* 
Note. *=p< .05, **=p < .01, ***=p< .001, Wilks’ Lambda  = .37, F (4 ,100 ) = 42.78, p< .001, Eta²= .63 
Total N both groups = 105, where 0 = never and 7 = continuously. 
Aircrew personnel were significantly more exposed to the stressor dimension entitled Risk of 
Equipment Failure (M=1.45, SD=1.17) compared to Staff personnel (M=0.67, SD=0.81); F(1, 103) 
= 16.50, p < .001, Eta² = .14.  On War-related Threat there was a statistically significant difference 
in scores for Aircrew personnel (M=2.53, SD=1.01) and Staff personnel (M=0.52, SD=0.69); F(1, 
103) = 146.70, p < .001, Eta² = .59, which means that Aircrew personnel experienced more 
exposure to war scenes and threat from the use of weapons than Staff personnel.  
On Harmful Exposure there was no significant difference in scores between Aircrew personnel 
(M=1.94, SD=1.64) and Staff personnel (M=1.76, SD=1.35); F(1, 103) = 0.40, p = .53, Eta² = .004. 
Staff scored highest on Harmful Exposure among the stressor components, indicating they were 
moderately exposed to seeing severely injured and died people. However, Aircrew personnel had a 
slightly higher mean score.   
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On Direct Threat to Life there was a statistically significant difference between Aircrew (M=0.30, 
SD= 0.51) and Staff personnel (M= 0.08, SD=0.39); F(1, 103) = 6.07, p < .05, Eta² = .56, i.e. both 
groups scored low on this dimension.  
Coping Strategies                                                                                                                
We measured the mean scores on each item on the Coping Strategies Scale and the frequencies of 
the number of respondents who answered the value 5, 6 or 7 on each coping strategy. “To be 
socially with others in the unit”(M=5.26, 74.2%) was the most frequently utilized coping strategy, 
followed by “talk to others about the incident” (M=5.15, 69.3%) and “have a colleague to talk to, 
confidentially” (M 5.13, 69,2%). The results showed that social contact and social support were 
judged to be very important after stressful incidents. This result was reinforced by responses to the 
question:”What was the most important strategy for you after stressful events?” Respondents were 
asked to pick, from the scale in order of priority, the most important items after stressful 
events.”Talk to others about the incident” was judged to be most important by 42% of the 
respondents, and 14% reported ”to have a colleague to talk to, confidentially” to be most important. 
These two items were picked by more than the half of the respondents followed by “call home to 
family” (7.0%), “engage in physical exercise” (5.8%), “be socially with the others in the unit” 
(4.7%), “know the enemy’s weapons” (4.7%)  (N=86).  
A final Principal Component Analysis, with oblique rotation, was conducted on 17 items of 
“Coping Strategies Scale”. To improve the reliability, five items from the original questionnaire (22 
items) were excluded, prior to PCA, because they failed to load. Inspection of the correlation matrix 
revealed the presence of coefficients of .3 and above and inspection of the scree plot showed 
inflexions that would justify retaining 4 components (Costello and Osborne 2005). The 
Keyser.Meyer.Olkin (KMO) value (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) was .874, exceeding the 
recommended value of .6 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) reached 
statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. The PCA revealed the 
presence of four components with eigenvalues exceeding Kaiser’s criterion of 1, explaining 68,7% 
of the total variance, and 45,3%, 10,2%, 6,8% and 6,3% of the variance respectively. The reliability 
and internal consistency was satisfactory with α above .78 and average corrected item total 
correlation above .73 on each component (Costello and Osborne, 2005).  
Table 4: Component loadings of Coping Strategies After Stressful Events Scale. 
Items                 Information       Social         Seek            Seek        Commu- 
                                              search           Support     Divertion    Safety          nalities 
56.think of what I could have done differently          -.75       -.08               .15   .15         .55 
54. aware of the conflict development  .75        .10               .19  -.01         .76 
53.know the enemy’s weapons                             .73        .12              -.11  -.20         .70 
55.know how close combat action took place .70        .10               .17  -.13         .76 
52. have access to their own medic  .57        .29              -.19  -.38         .76 
39.talk to others about the incident  .02        .92              -.07   .10         .77 
48.have a colleague to talk to confidentially .05        .79               .01  -.14         .76 
40.be socially with others in the unit               .07        .78               .11  -.02         .74 
43.engage in physical exercise                            .05        .32               .68    26         .66 
57.think about the positive aspects of mission          -.18       -.06               .68  -.23         .73 
58. know that it was unlikely to get injured          .21       -.16               .59  -.28         .62 
47.call home to family                                         .09        .34               .48             -.09         .59 
60.do something for the civilian population  .23        .04               .47             -.15         .46 
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Table 3 shows Aircrew personnel had higher mean value rating on all stressor dimensions compared 
to Staff personnel, which means that Aircrew personnel were subjected to more stressors than Staff 
personnel. As seen in Table 3, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) showed there was a 
statistically significant overall higher score among Aircrew personnel than Staff personnel in 
Stressors, Wilks’ Lambda =.37, F (4, 100) = 42.78, p< .001, Eta² = .63. 
 
Table 3:  Differences in Stressor Experience Aircrew and Staff personnel compared 
 
 Air crew personnel Ser  Staff personnel 
Stressors  4 Dimensions     N M  SD  N M  SD              F value  
S1. Risk of Equipment 
Failure 
48 1.45 1.17  57 0.67 0.81             16.46*** 
S2. War-related Threat 48 2.53 1.01  57 0.52 0.69           146.70*** 
S3. Harmful Exposure 48 1.94 1.64  57 1.76 1.35                  .62 
S4. Direct Threat to Life 48 0.30 0.51  57 0.08 0.39               6.07* 
Note. *=p< .05, **=p < .01, ***=p< .001, Wilks’ Lambda  = .37, F (4 ,100 ) = 42.78, p< .001, Eta²= .63 
Total N both groups = 105, where 0 = never and 7 = continuously. 
Aircrew personnel were significantly more exposed to the stressor dimension entitled Risk of 
Equipment Failure (M=1.45, SD=1.17) compared to Staff personnel (M=0.67, SD=0.81); F(1, 103) 
= 16.50, p < .001, Eta² = .14.  On War-related Threat there was a statistically significant difference 
in scores for Aircrew personnel (M=2.53, SD=1.01) and Staff personnel (M=0.52, SD=0.69); F(1, 
103) = 146.70, p < .001, Eta² = .59, which means that Aircrew personnel experienced more 
exposure to war scenes and threat from the use of weapons than Staff personnel.  
On Harmful Exposure there was no significant difference in scores between Aircrew personnel 
(M=1.94, SD=1.64) and Staff personnel (M=1.76, SD=1.35); F(1, 103) = 0.40, p = .53, Eta² = .004. 
Staff scored highest on Harmful Exposure among the stressor components, indicating they were 
moderately exposed to seeing severely injured and died people. However, Aircrew personnel had a 
slightly higher mean score.   
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On Direct Threat to Life there was a statistically significant difference between Aircrew (M=0.30, 
SD= 0.51) and Staff personnel (M= 0.08, SD=0.39); F(1, 103) = 6.07, p < .05, Eta² = .56, i.e. both 
groups scored low on this dimension.  
Coping Strategies                                                                                                                
We measured the mean scores on each item on the Coping Strategies Scale and the frequencies of 
the number of respondents who answered the value 5, 6 or 7 on each coping strategy. “To be 
socially with others in the unit”(M=5.26, 74.2%) was the most frequently utilized coping strategy, 
followed by “talk to others about the incident” (M=5.15, 69.3%) and “have a colleague to talk to, 
confidentially” (M 5.13, 69,2%). The results showed that social contact and social support were 
judged to be very important after stressful incidents. This result was reinforced by responses to the 
question:”What was the most important strategy for you after stressful events?” Respondents were 
asked to pick, from the scale in order of priority, the most important items after stressful 
events.”Talk to others about the incident” was judged to be most important by 42% of the 
respondents, and 14% reported ”to have a colleague to talk to, confidentially” to be most important. 
These two items were picked by more than the half of the respondents followed by “call home to 
family” (7.0%), “engage in physical exercise” (5.8%), “be socially with the others in the unit” 
(4.7%), “know the enemy’s weapons” (4.7%)  (N=86).  
A final Principal Component Analysis, with oblique rotation, was conducted on 17 items of 
“Coping Strategies Scale”. To improve the reliability, five items from the original questionnaire (22 
items) were excluded, prior to PCA, because they failed to load. Inspection of the correlation matrix 
revealed the presence of coefficients of .3 and above and inspection of the scree plot showed 
inflexions that would justify retaining 4 components (Costello and Osborne 2005). The 
Keyser.Meyer.Olkin (KMO) value (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) was .874, exceeding the 
recommended value of .6 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) reached 
statistical significance, supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. The PCA revealed the 
presence of four components with eigenvalues exceeding Kaiser’s criterion of 1, explaining 68,7% 
of the total variance, and 45,3%, 10,2%, 6,8% and 6,3% of the variance respectively. The reliability 
and internal consistency was satisfactory with α above .78 and average corrected item total 
correlation above .73 on each component (Costello and Osborne, 2005).  
Table 4: Component loadings of Coping Strategies After Stressful Events Scale. 
Items                 Information       Social         Seek            Seek        Commu- 
                                              search           Support     Divertion    Safety          nalities 
56.think of what I could have done differently          -.75       -.08               .15   .15         .55 
54. aware of the conflict development  .75        .10               .19  -.01         .76 
53.know the enemy’s weapons                             .73        .12              -.11  -.20         .70 
55.know how close combat action took place .70        .10               .17  -.13         .76 
52. have access to their own medic  .57        .29              -.19  -.38         .76 
39.talk to others about the incident  .02        .92              -.07   .10         .77 
48.have a colleague to talk to confidentially .05        .79               .01  -.14         .76 
40.be socially with others in the unit               .07        .78               .11  -.02         .74 
43.engage in physical exercise                            .05        .32               .68    26         .66 
57.think about the positive aspects of mission          -.18       -.06               .68  -.23         .73 
58. know that it was unlikely to get injured          .21       -.16               .59  -.28         .62 
47.call home to family                                         .09        .34               .48             -.09         .59 
60.do something for the civilian population  .23        .04               .47             -.15         .46 
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50.know that there was shelters in camp               -.25        .07              -.09             -.77         .80 
46.to have continuous work                               -.13        .03               .30             -.72         .68 
51.know that the camp area was guarded  .34        .01               .01             -.72         .83 
49.confidential chat with the commander               -.19        .33               .29             -.41         .49  
Eigenvalues                                                             7.69     1.74             1.16            1.07  
% of variance                                                           45.29   10.23             6.81            6.30  
alpha                                                                    .87       .85               .81    .82  
 
Table 4 shows the items clustered in four different coping strategy components. The first 
component was Seek Information, which measured the extent of knowing about the conflict 
development and enemy’s weapons and thinking of one’s own alternative courses of action. The 
second component, Seeking Social Support, measured the extent of having someone to talk to after 
incidents and to be socially with others in the unit. The third component, Seeks Diversion, measured 
the extent of doing exercise, calling one’s family or thinking positively. The fourth coping strategy 
component was Seek Safety, which measured the extent of focusing on shelters and protection in 
camp and doing continuous work.  
As seen in Table 5, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) showed there was a statistically 
significant overall higher score among Aircrew personnel than Staff personnel in Coping Strategies, 
Wilks’ Lambda =.81, F (4, 93) = 5.38, p< .001, Eta² = .19.  
Table 5: Coping Strategies Comparing Aircrew vs Staff 
 Air crew personnel Ser  Service/Staff personnel 
Coping  4 Dimensions     N M  SD  N M  SD         F value  
C1. Seek Information 48 23.27 6.88   50 19.88 8.30         4.83** 
C2. Social Support 48 15.92 4.27   50 15.04 4.89         0.89 
C3. Seek Divertion 48 22.31 6.51   50 21.80 8.02         0.12 
C4. Seek Safety 48 14.17 5.88   50 15.74 6.35         1.62 
Note. *=p< .05, **=p < .01, ***=p< .001, Wilks’ Lambda  = .81, F (4 ,93 ) = 5.38, p< .001, Eta²= .19 
Total N both groups = 98 
 
The only single component to reach significant difference was Seek Information, F(1, 96) = 4.83**, 
p = .03, Eta² = .05.  The estimated marginal mean scores indicated that Aircrew personnel reported 
higher levels of “Seek Information” (M=23.27, SD 6.88) than Staff personnel (M=19.88, SD=8.30), 
which means that Aircrew personnel more often resorted to proactive search for information as a 
coping strategy than Staff personnel.  There were no significant differences between Aircrew and 
Staff on component Social Support, Seek Divertion and Seek Safety. 
 
Military Performance   
                                                                                                                   
Table 6 shows 18 items of expectations (before deployment) and self-assessment (after deployment) 
of Military Skills, categorized in high and low scores. Rankings are based on the scores after 
deployment. There was a significant decline in total mean from 4.02 (Tot M 72.27, SD 7.14) before 
deployment down to 3.44 (Tot M 64.91, SD 15.89) after deployment. Military Skills on “high” level 
had the character of dealing with general stress and acting on known challenges, while on the “low” 
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level were more connected to the handling of life-threatening challenges and coping with real 
danger. 
 
Table 6: Assessment of Military Skills Before and After Service in NAD. Mean values 
 
I expect (before)/experienced (after) my …:  Before   After                       
High Mean (SD)     Mean (SD)       Diff          
ability to cope with stress 4.27 ( .57) 4.14  ( .65)      -.13 
ability to keep a cool head in stressful situations 4.09 ( .76) 4.07 (1.03)      -.02 
physical capacity and endurance to be… 3.96 ( .79) 3.94 ( .81)       -.02 
ability to co-operate in stressful situations 4.14 ( .59) 3.81 (1.24)      -.33 
ability to cope with periods of low activity 3.84 ( .94) 3.73 (1.02)      -.11 
willingness to act on command in emergency situations 4.34 ( .55) 3.68 (1.45)      -.66 
ability to make decisions in stressful situations 4.02 ( .67) 3.60 (1.41)      -.42 
willing to participate in future international operations 4.01(1.02) 3.56 (1.28)      -.45 
ability to provide support to others in stressful situations 4.10 ( .73) 3.53 (1.33)      -.57 
Law                                                                                                             
ability to give clear orders under pressure 3.93 ( .83) 3.37 (1.50)      -.46 
ablility to perform the mission even if the conditions are chaotic 4.12 ( .53) 3.32 (1.71)      -.80 
ability to motivate others in difficult circumstances 3.89 ( .81) 3.25 (1.45)      -.64 
combat skills and handling of weapons at individual  level 3.73 ( .79) 3.43 (.97)        -.40 
ability to talk about feelings after stressful events 3.94 ( .95) 3.33 (1.36)      -.61 
ability to quickly recognize danger 3.82 ( .76) 3.24 (1.55)      -.58 
ability to judge others’ performance in stressful situations 3.66 ( .77) 3.17 (1.47)      -.49 
ability to take leadership role in stressful situations 3.92 ( .75) 3.13 (1.70)      -.79 
ability to act even if I am threatened 4.08 ( .70) 2.85 (1.96)   - 1.23 
Total Score** 72.27(7.14) 64.91(15.89) 
Note. *=p< .05, **=p < .01, ***=p< .001, Wilks’ Lambda  = .87, F (2 ,66 ) = 4.80*, p< .05, Eta²= .13 
Total N both groups = 69. NB: Rankings are based on the “After service scores”. 
Table 7: Military Skills Before and After Service Comparing Aircrew vs Staff in NAD 
                                               Aircrew personell         Staff personell   
Military Skills  N        M          SD       N        M          SD     F  
Before service  35      73.71    7.23      34      70.79      6.83   2.97 
After service  35      70.40     8.43      34      59.26    19.56   9.53** 
Note. Total N = 69, Wilks Lambda = .87, F (2, 66) = 4.80, p = .01, Eta² = .13. 
Table 7 shows that there was a significant overall difference in Military Skills due to personnel 
group belongingness and time span (before and after deployment) (Wilks’ Lambda =.87, F (2, 66) = 
4.80**, p =.01, Eta²  = .13.). Before service there were no differences in Military Skills between 
groups. Comparison after service showed that Aircrew personnel judged their Military Skills to be 
better compared to Staff personnel (F(1, 66) = 9.53**, p= .003, Eta² = .13.). The estimated marginal 
mean scores indicated that Aircrew personnel reported higher levels of Military Skills after mission 
(M=70.40, SD 8.43) than Staff personnel (M=59.26; SD=19.56). 
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Military Performance   
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11 
 
level were more connected to the handling of life-threatening challenges and coping with real 
danger. 
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Table 8 shows that the predictor variables (step 1: Demographic, step 2: Stressor components, step 
3: Coping Strategy components explained 37% (respectively: .10, .06, .21) of the variance in 
Military Skills, R² = .37, F(11, 78) = 4.19, p<.001. 
 
Table 8: Predictions of Demographic variables, Stressors and Coping Strategies  
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S1 Risk of Equipment Failure    .13   -.01 
S2 War-Related Threat    .07    .18 
S3 Harmful Exposure    .15    .09 
S4 Direct Threat to life  -.00   -.00 
Step 3:Coping Strategy Dimensions    
C1 Seek Information      .09 
C2 Seek Social Support      .29* 
C3 Seek Diversion      .14 




  .10 
  .10 
3.08* 
  .16 
  .06 
1.48 
   .37 
   .21 
 6.63*** 
Note. N = 89, p<.05=*, p<.01=**, p<.001=***. ¹Personnel Category = Aircrew & Staff 
Different demographic variables such as military experience, education, sex and marital status were 
tried out as control variable without any significant association. To control for Personnel category 
we added variable Aircrew and Staff in the first step, which showed as the only significant single 
variable associated to Military Skills in step 1 (ß = .31 p<.01) though it was not significant in the 
second and third step. Social Support was the only single component who contributed significantly 
in the third step (ß =.29, p<.05). 
 
Discussion 
Practical Implications from the standpoint of hypotheses 
This study shows that there are differences in stress exposure between operational personnel and 
“in-camp” personnel during deployment of a modern war scenario. Aircrew scored significantly 
higher than Staff personnel on War-related Threats, Risk of Equipment Failure and Direct Threat to 
Life. In previous studies of Norwegian military personnel in Kosovo, it had also been found that 
Risk of Equipment Failure was a key stressor (Kobbeltvedt, et al., 2004).  Comparing with Campell 
and Nobel (2009) categories this indicates a moderate exposure of stressors in the category of 
subset 2, 3 and 4 and low stressor load in the category of subset 1 for Aircrew personnel. In general, 
Staff personnel scored low on war-related stressor burden, but were equally exposed as operational 
personnel on Harmful Exposure experiencing seriously injured and dead others (subset 3). This 
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shows that in camp personnel also are prone to stress load in a modern war scenario, but at fewer 
venues than operational personnel. The result confirms the Hypothesis (H1) that operational 
personnel experience higher stressor exposure than “in camp” personnel during deployment in a 
modern war scenario.  
 The study revealed four key components of coping strategies that are helpful after stressful service: 
Seek Information, Seek Safety, Seek Diversity and Seek Social Support. The results supported the 
second hypothesis (H2) that Social Support appeared as a separate component on the Coping 
Strategies Scale (Moldjord et al. 2001; 2003). Results showed no differences in the score on 
component Social Support between the measuring groups. This was supported in the findings of 
social contact and trusting conversations as the most important coping strategy after stressful events 
among both groups. This suggests that social support, as a coping strategy, is important regardless 
of the role or stress exposure in a war context. 
Seek Information was the only coping strategy dimension where Aircrew personnel reported to 
score significantly higher than Staff personnel. Seeking relevant information about the conflict 
development and the enemy’s weapons can give a higher perception of control. Those who 
remained in camp seem not in need of the same information probably because it was not crucial for 
their duty. This may be an indication of a more passive approach towards the whole situation for 
Staff personnel. 
Aircrew and Staff personnel scored generally high on Military Skills prior to service in NAD, 
suggesting a high pre-deployment expectation of their own military performance (Driskell et al. 
2006; Krueger, 2008). It is believed that the high expectations of self-assessed military performance 
before deployment is a cause of general decline in self-assessment of military performance after 
deployment. All personnel scored lower on their experience of Military Skills after service with the 
greatest decrease among Staff personnel identifying a significant difference between Aircrew and 
Staff. This finding rejected the third hypothesis (H3) that Operational personnel have higher 
increase in military performance than Staff personnel. This was a surprising result, since previous 
studies have shown increase in the rating of Military Skills by experience (Laberg et al,. 2002; 
Widing, Davøen, Laberg, Johnsen, Brun, & Eid, 2002). It was still interesting to see what other 
factors that influenced the variation in self-assessed military performance from before to after 
service. 
The stressor dimension “War-Related Threat” was expected to have impact on military performance 
because this was the component that gave NAD personnel a manageable military challenge and thus 
provided a base for self-evaluation against the actual requirements. The fourth hypothesis (H4) was 
rejected because of the decline in Military Skills from before to after deployment, although the 
decrease was marginal for Aircrew. Aircrew personnel were very active in service execution and 
much more directly involved in the conflict’s realities than were Staff.  Aircrew personnel 
experienced active coping in the face of moderate level of War Related Threats and handling of the 
Risk of Equipment Failure. This contributes to understand how overcoming difficult challenges 
helps to increase positive outcome expectancy among Aircrew personnel (Ursin & Erichsen 2004).  
On the other hand, the Staff personnel inside the camp area were more affected by maintenance and 
routines, times of waiting and not being challenged in the same way. They had a low stressor load 
and experienced their military skills as not being really tested during service. At the same time, they 
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watched Aircrew personnel and other combat patrols coming in to camp from tough missions and 
coping with a service that was much more challenging. This may create a passive existence where 
participants are becoming increasingly hesitant to act, resulting in considering the realities of war at 
a distance or through others (Lukey, & Pepe, 2008).  By passive presence you may feel a greater 
gap between expectations about your own military performance and what you actually experience 
(Lukey, & Pepe, 2008). This limited opportunities to make use of skills can even cause frustrations 
and stress (Bandura, 1997). This may be part of an explanation as to why self-assessed military 
performance declined significantly from before to after service for Staff personnel.  
Social Support explained a significant part of the variance in self-assessed military performance. 
Similar findings were made in the Kosovo study (Widing, et al., 2002). The fifth hypothesis (H5) 
was nevertheless rejected because of the overall decline in self-assessed military performance from 
before to after deployment. Personnel who were active in the aircrew flying on missions and 
evacuating wounded out of conflict areas seem to have other benefits from social support than Staff 
personnel. For aircrew personnel it seems that there was a need to share experience about the 
incident after they had completed stressful missions. For Staff personnel it may be that the social 
life in camp was more conducive to a “reality orientation” concerning their own military 
performance compared with Aircrew personnel and other operative task forces based in camp. One 
explanation of this may be that Social Support helped to create the social arena in NAD and so 
contributed to an openness and awareness about which military skills that were relevant and 
desirable in such a setting. This may contribute to understand why Social Support explained 
variance in self-assessed military performance.  
Theoretical implications, limitatons and future research 
 
What have we learned from this study?    In this study we ask if war stressor experience has positive 
impact on military performance. The results show an insignificant negligible decline in military 
performance for operational personnel experiencing moderate war stressors. There was a significant 
decline for “in camp” personnel with low stressor load. Although the result showed that stressors 
did not predict military performance, significantly, the result suggests that moderate to high stressor 
exposure has better impact on military performance than a moderate to low stressor exposure. An 
explanation could be that expected military performance was high in both groups because of pre-
deployment training (Bandura 1997; Driskel et al. 2006) and that low stressor exposure limited 
testing of military skills for Staff personnel. This is supported by previous research showing that the 
degree of effort in a mission, and regarding the outcome is positive or negative, has influence on 
self-assessed military performance (Lukey & Pepe, 2008; Mandel et al., 2010). As earlier noted, 
“stressful experiences can be an opportunity for positive individual growth as a way to make 
meaning out of challenging and painful experiences”(Lukey & Pepe, 2008).This is something we 
can recognize from military personnel serving in Search and Rescue and medical units. Rescuing 
wounded soldiers from the battlefield in a helicopter operation and saving lives in acute medical 
operations are meaningful experiences, despite heavy risk and extreme scenes being part of it 
(Folland, 2009). This was to a greater extent the situation of operational Aircrew members than 
Staff in this study. 
Results on Social Support show that this factor is of great importance in a military context, as in 
Afghanistan, regardless of whether personnel are operational or “in camp”. Military personnel 
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experiencing modern war scenarios, even if they are non-combat, have a need to talk to someone 
trusted after stressful experiences. To facilitate this type of social contact after stressful events as a 
“buddy” like approach therefore appears to be appropriate. This finding supports relevant theories 
(Milgram, et al., 1989) and is also in line with the reports from recent military research (Delahaij, 
Gaillard, & Soeters, 2006; Limbert, 2004; Overdale and Gardner 2012; Hall, 2009; Reevy, 2007) 
and experienced operators (Campbell, 2006; Folland, 2009; Johansen, 2011). This requires a 
facilitation of suitable venues where personnel can feel confident about meeting and share 
experience. A leadership showing willingness and ability to organize such venues is also required.    
What are the logical studies that follow from this study?  Theories on military psychology deal with 
military personnel coping strategies arising from the experience of stressful incidents only to a 
small degree. How you cope after such incidents may determine whether to increase or decrease 
your subjective military performance. This is an important step to enable every soldier to recover 
from stressful assignments and get ready for the next challenge. The impact of different war stressor 
and following coping strategies impact on military performance thus requires further exploration. 
Research on military performance shows different definitions and spans from job satisfaction 
(Limbert 2004) to high performance skills (Hancock and Szalma 2008). A revised theory of military 
performance seems necessary. In addition the impact of social support on military performance 
needs further exploration. The importance of unit morale, motivation and health is known in prior 
research but the impact social support has on military performance lacks comparative studies. 
There are some limitations of this study we need to point out. The sample size varied widely 
between the pre- and post- measurement (N= 175 for Q1 and N=109 for Q2), In addition there were 
a number of incomplete responses to Q2 ending up in low sample sizes (N below 100) for the 
different analyses. This introduces a degree of uncertainty into the results and limits 
generalizability.  Low sample size on both PCA threatens generalization, but data appears to be 
strong through high communalities and several variables loading strongly on each factor (Costello 
and Osborne 2005).  
Items on the Stressor Scale aimed at measuring the frequency of stressful and critical situations 
during the mission were probably easier to identify with for "combat exposed" Aircrew personnel 
than for "non-combat" “In-camp” personnel. “In-camp” personnel were probably more vulnerable 
to “normal” stressors such as isolation, threat of living in an unstable situation, and language 
problems and different leadership due to different nationalities. This was not explicitly measured in 
this study. Therefore the total stressor burden for “In-camp” personnel were somewhat incomplete 
measured here. Nevertheless, the Stressor Scale measured war-related stressors for both groups.  
The Military Skills Scale aimed to measure military performance through how the respondents 
evaluated their handling of military challenges, in general. Items on Military Skills Scale could have 
been more specific to the operational skills required for Aircrew personnel and to the skills required 
to the special conditions of working as Military Staff in a camp in Afghanistan. Some items were 
therefore experienced as less relevant among some respondents. This was probably the reason for 
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generalizability.  Low sample size on both PCA threatens generalization, but data appears to be 
strong through high communalities and several variables loading strongly on each factor (Costello 
and Osborne 2005).  
Items on the Stressor Scale aimed at measuring the frequency of stressful and critical situations 
during the mission were probably easier to identify with for "combat exposed" Aircrew personnel 
than for "non-combat" “In-camp” personnel. “In-camp” personnel were probably more vulnerable 
to “normal” stressors such as isolation, threat of living in an unstable situation, and language 
problems and different leadership due to different nationalities. This was not explicitly measured in 
this study. Therefore the total stressor burden for “In-camp” personnel were somewhat incomplete 
measured here. Nevertheless, the Stressor Scale measured war-related stressors for both groups.  
The Military Skills Scale aimed to measure military performance through how the respondents 
evaluated their handling of military challenges, in general. Items on Military Skills Scale could have 
been more specific to the operational skills required for Aircrew personnel and to the skills required 
to the special conditions of working as Military Staff in a camp in Afghanistan. Some items were 
therefore experienced as less relevant among some respondents. This was probably the reason for 




Adding Personnel Category, as a dichotomous variable, to the Regression analysis first step may 
have underestimated the real effect. These shortcomings in the Military Skills Scale may include 
bias in the study that we have not taken into account.  
Despite the above limitations and although the design of this study is complex, we believe that the 
result revealed in this study is a contribution to informing future training and pre-deployment 
programs to be aware, that even if the stressor burden differs among different categories of 
personnel, the use and need of social support may be equal, social support may serve different 
positive purposes in the military environment and social support may contribute to reflection about 
your own military performance. It is therefore worth considering how social support is facilitated 
and organized in the military environment. This is also an aspect worth examining in further 
research. 
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THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ACADEMIC SELF-EFFICACY, 




Self-efficacy, self-determination theory (SDT), intrinsic motivation, military competence 
 
Abstract 
This study investigated the moderating role of intrinsic motivation for military studies on the 
relationship between academic self-efficacy and change in perceived military competence. We 
present two concurrent hypotheses based on theoretical interaction effects of intrinsic 
motivation. Data from 245 cadets from three military academies revealed a positive relationship 
between self-efficacy and an increase in perceived military competence only for cadets with 
lower levels of intrinsic motivation. This suggests that, with lower intrinsic motivation, beliefs 
about one’s capabilities to organize and take courses of action to attain certain goals may make 
a crucial difference in cadets’ compliance to exert effort to increase their military competence. 
In contrast, self-efficacy seems less important for increased perception of military competence in 
cadets with higher intrinsic motivation. These cadets probably increase their military 
competence mainly as a result of the pleasure they gain when engaging in educational activities. 




Perceived competence is seen as a major factor in all types of educational processes, and prior 
research in a military context have found satisfactory concordance between self-reported military 
competence and demonstration of effort and expertise in military personal (Adler, Thomas and 
Castro 2005). Thus, perception of military competence as an indicator of military performance is 
seen as one major aim in military education. A study performed on an American Stryker brigade 
revealed that soldiers with well-developed psychological skills performed better on physical tests 
than soldiers with less-developed psychological skills (Hammermeister et al. 2010). However, 
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